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The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in STS 22206, Instructions
_or Preparation of FMEA and CIL. I0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Remote Manipulator
System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and poten-
tial critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then
compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L
updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the
comparison is provided through additional analysis as required.
This report documents the results of that comparison for the
Orbiter RMS hardware.
The IOA product for the RMS analysis consisted of six hundred
four failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in four hundred
fifty-eight potential critical items being identified.
Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as of September ii,
1986) which consisted of four hundred fifty FMEAs and three
hundred twenty-one CIL items. The comparison determined if there
were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in
the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but
one hundred fifty-four FMEAs which caused differences in one
hundred thirty seven CIL items. Figure 1 presents an overview of
the original assessment and the final resolution that was arrived
at between NASA and IOA personnel. The sixty-nine issues that
still exist all have a common source which is NASA's identifying
RMS software routines as unlike redundancy. This allowed the
identified sixty-nine FMEAs to be classified as 2/IR. IOA feels
that these software routines do not represent unlike redundancy
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2 • 0 INTRODUCTION
2 •I Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and











The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing available drawings, schematics and documents to breakdown the
respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware
items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode,
effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the
respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the
NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA
analysis approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0
through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is to be performed and
documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
w
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
-The_S _ ground ruies and assumptions Used--ih_he iOA are
defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were
defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the



























3.1 Design and Function
The RMS is a major component of the Payload Deployment and
Recovery System (PDRS) of the Space Shuttle Orbiter. It is used
primarily for the deployment of payloads in orbit or the
retrieval of payloads from orbit for return to earth or
redeployment in orbit. The RMS is also used in conjunction with
the Manipulator Foot Restraint (MFR) for various Extra Vehicular
Activity (EVA) tasks.
The RMS is an Anthropomorphic Man-machine System that consists of
six servocontrolled rotary joints and an end effector all
connected together by structural boom members. The RMS is
attached to the orbiter longeron (port, starboard, or both)
through a roll-out mechanism. The arm is operated by a crew
member using direct viewing and closed circuit television (CCTV),
from the Display and Control (D&C) station located on the aft
flight deck.
The primary components of the RMS are:
o Backup Drive Amplifier (BDA)
o Display and Control Panel (D&C)
o End Effector (EE)
o End Effector Electronics Unit (EEU)
o Joint Power Conditioner (JPC)
o Manipulator Controller Interface Unit (MCIU)
o Motor Module/Signal Conditioning Unit (MM/SCU)
o Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)
o Servo Power Amplifier (SPA)
o Translation Hand Controller (THC)
o Thermal Protection Kit (TPK)
3.1.i Backup Drive Amplifier - There is only one BDA for
each RMS and it is located in the shoulder joint's
electronics housing. The BDA is a backup unit to any of
the SPAs, in the event of a SPA failure or its
associated power source (JPC). The main functions of
the BDA are to provide drive to any one joint motor as
selected from the D&C panel and to provide for power
conditioning from the backup +28 V bus.
3.1.2 Display and Control - The D&C panel provides
primary/backup control on display functions, and
contains D&C electronics and Orbiter/THC/RHC wiring
interfaces. All of the displays and the majority of the
controls are used to control and monitor the RMS in its
prime modes of operation. Three control functions,
located on a separate section of the D&C panel, form the







End Effector - The standard EE is designed to effect
the capture or release of a previously captured payload
by means of capture/release and rigidize/derigidize
operations. The capture/release sequences are achieved
by rotating internal rings located at the open end of
the EE body to open or close three Wire snares around
the payload grapple fixture. The rigidize/derigidize
sequences withdraw the snare assembly towards the rear
of the EE body thereby tensioning the snare wires and
pulling the snared payload into full and keyed
orientation and contact with the end effector, or
extend the snare assembly to release tension on the
payload. The EE consists esSentia_IIy Of the EE body,
prime channel drive chain, EEEU, EE wiring harness,
Backup release system, and seven microswitches for
status of the EE.
End Effector Electronics Unit - The EEEU is located
within the EE body and controls and monitors the
operation of the EE as commanded by the operator from
the D&C panel. This includes power conditioning,
command decoding, detects failures in decoding and
commutator logic, outputs signal flags, and conditions
the EE status signals which are sent to the MCIU via the
data bus.
Joint Power Conditioner - There are two JPCs per
manipulator arm. One of which is located in the shoulder
joint electronics compartment serving the shoulder and
elbow joints, and the second is located in the wrist
electronics compartment serving the three wrist joints.
The JPCs convert the +28 V dc bus to provide secondary
regulated supply voltages of +15 V and +i0.i V dc to the
SPA's motor commutators and position encoders.
Overvoltage and undervoltage protection circuits are
provided to shut off the JPC if preset threshold values
are exceeded or not achieved.
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit - The MCIU handles
the exchange of information between the Orbiter GPC and
the RMS and other entities of the system. The MCIU
performs manipulation of data but does not have any
significant data processing function. In addition to
GPC/MCIU communication the MCIU has data communication
with the Arm Based Electronics (ABE) and the D&C, does
data gathering from the THC, RHC, and temperature
sensors, does hard wired fault detection and
annunciation, performs auto safing, brake drive control,
auto braking, EE drive commands in EE auto mode, and

































Motor Module/Signal Conditioning Unit - The Motor Module
(MM) functions as a servo motor providing the mechanical
drive for joint movement in response to commands from
the MCIU via the SPA, and in response to the feedback
signal from the tachometer. This tachometer feedback
signal is low level and is amplified by the SCU for use
by the MM.
Rotational Hand Controller - The RHC is a three axis
manual controller which provides electrical control
signals for the RMS point of resolution (POR) in the
pitch, yaw, and roll degrees of freedom. These control
signals are proportional to the manual input
displacement of the RHC handgrip in each of the three
mutually perpendicular axis. The RHC handgrip also has
three secondary switch inputs for rate hold,
vernier/coarse, and capture/release. The gimbal
assembly is the main mechanism that obtains the manual
commands input into the handgrip. Transducers provide
the appropriate signals to the MCIU.
Servo Power Amplifier - Each RMS has six SPAs, one for
each joint. Each SPA provides a drive signal to it's
joint motor in response to MCIU control signals or
direct drive commands from the D&C panel. The SPA also
provides an excitation signal to the tachometer,
transmits data back to the MCIU, releases the joint
brake in response to a MCIU command, performs self-
testing, switches the motor drive from MDA to BDA on
command, and transmits external flags to the MCIU.
Translation Hand Controller - The THC allows the
operator to control the three-dimensional linear motion
of the end effector by means of manual inputs through
the controller handgrip. The POR velocity commands are
proportional to the deflection of the handle. Three
independent electrical signals are provided, by the THCs
gimbal assembly transducers, to the MCIU, one for each
control axis. This gimbal mechanism, located within the
THC assembly, is the main mechanism for obtaining the X,
Y, and Z axis commands.
Thermal Protection Kit - The RMS uses active and passive
thermal control systems both to keep the RMS within
proper operating temperatures and to isolate the mani-
pulator arm from the space environment. This TPK
essentially consists of thermal blankets, white paint,
heaters and thermostats, and thermistors. The thermal
blankets primarily provide the space environment
isolation function. The white paint minimizes external
heat input while maximizing heat radiation due to
internal dissipation of electronics. The heaters and
thermostats control the temperature within limits while
the thermistors provide the temperature monitoring
function.
m
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The components of the RMS are located on the aft flight deck of
the crew compartment and within the payload bay of the Orbiter.
The items in the crew compartment are the RHC, THC, D&C Panel,
MCIU and the GPC. The manipulator arm, SPAs, JPCs, BDA, MM/SCU,
EE, and EEEU are located in the payload bay along the port
longeron (or starboard longeron or both).
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 2 through 7 illustrate the hierarchy of the RMS
















































































































































_ _ u-co i
_LLIO i












i _ rJ _..ji x I---
i-.-J
I--Z_ z





































































































































_ _ i_ _ _i_!_ ¸ _¸


























The IOA analysis of the RMS hardware initially generated five
hundred seventy-four failure mode worksheets and identified
four hundred thirteen Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before
starting the assessment pr0cess. _ Ninety-three additional
failure mode analyses worksheets were generated. To match
additional failures identified by NASA but not identified by IOA.
This IOA baseline of six hundred sixty-seven FMEAs was then
compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of four hundred
fifty FMEAs and three hundred twenty-one CIL items, which was
generated using the Rockwell 100-2G FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon
completion of the assessment, five hundred thirteen of the six
hundred sixty-seven FMEAs were in agreement. Of the one hundred
fifty-four that remained, sixty-nine were based on using software
as a redundant system and the remaining eighty five FMEAs were
resolved with the NASA subsystem manager.
In summary all failures identified bY NASA and IOA were assessed
and all were found within the new NASA baseline of four hundred
fifty-three FMEAs. NASA allowed multiple failures to be recorded
on a single FMEA which accounts for the lower number of FMEAs
than the IOA analysis which allowed only a single failure per
FMEA. The same holds true for the CIL resolution. The sixty-
nine issues are based on the use of software routines as unlike
redundancy. IOA recommends that these sixty-nine FMEAs be
upgraded from their present 2/IR criticality to i/I criticality
because they representuncommande _ motion.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.




































A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
4
I Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment ]
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Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and issessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains the IOA analysis worksheets that were used to assess
the NASA FMEA/CIL. Appendix F provldes a Cross reference between
the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the I0A recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs. All six
hundred sixty-seven failure criticalities are contained in the









































































Of the failure modes analyzed, three hundred twenty-four were
determined to be critical items. A summary of the IOA

















The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis




I TABLE V IOA Worksheet Numbers I







I01 to 368, 20001 to 20040, 20369 to 20383
401 to 505, 20506 to 20523
601 to 698, 20699 to 20711
801 to 892, 20893 to 20897




4.1 Results - Final
The results of the RMS assessment are that one hundred fifty-four
issues were identified. Eighty-five of these were resolved with
_he NASA subsystem manager. Of these eighty-five issues, sixty-
four were resolved without change to the baseline. Twenty-one
failure modes were added to the FMEA baseline. Six IOA failure
modes were combined, resulting in three new FMEAs and three new
_IL_tems. _ _FifteenioAfailure m6des Wereadded_asaddi£ional
causes to existing FMEAs. The sixty-nine IOA RMS issues that
remain open concern the difference in criticalities due to
software routines being classified as unlike redundancy.
mine
17


















Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the assessment. The documentation used included the following:
I. Space Shuttle Programs Orbiter Avionics Software
OPS Detailed Design Specification, Vol. III -
Applications Part 2 - System Management, 12/20/83
2. SPAR/RMS/PA.1067, Issue A
3. PDRS Console Handbook, Vol. II, 3/21/84
4. JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C
5. SPAR Wirelists and Schematics (33)



















































































- Arm Based Electronics
- Alternating Current
- Abort Once Around
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Assembly
- Abort to Orbit
- Backup Flight System
- Backup Drive Amplifier




- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
- direct current
- Distribution
- Data Processing System
- Display Unit
- Display & Control
- End Effector
- End Effector Electronics Unit





- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- General Purpose Computer
- Gallons Per Minute




- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Joint Power Conditioner
- Johnson Space Center
- Load Control Assembly
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Liquid Oxygen
- Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controller
- Main
MN/SCU - Motor Module/Signal Conditioning Unit
MONIT - Monitoring

































- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Push Button Indicator
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Payload Deployment and Recovery System
- Point of Resolution
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Manipulator System
- Remote Power Controller
- Return to Launch Site
- Systems Management
- Servopower Amplifier ....
- SolidRocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Space Transportation System
- Software _: : _
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Translation Hand Controller
- Thermal Protection Kit
- Thrust Vector Control


























Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions







DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 52206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE CCAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTTNG_NCy CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and


















MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
0FF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
_ASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear






DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
w
m
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules andAssumPtions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, _st_uctions for
preparation of _A/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the








The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs) .
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or Which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error


























All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level Of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAS assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
g
B.3 RMS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level. The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety•
ii ARMS mission is considered to be uncradling,
grappling a berthed payload, unberthing it, deploying
it and then retrieving a rotating payload, berthing it
and performing MFR operations. Any failure that
prevents the completion of any of these tasks is loss
of mission (i.e. loss of manual augmented modes).
RATIONALE: This is the most demanding nominal RMS
mission possible. This causes the worst
case criticalities for certain failures
because they will prevent the completion of
this mission. If the mission was simpler,
many failures would be a lower criticality.
• Consistency checking and safing is not considered
redundancy for failures that cause uncommanded motion.
RATIONALE : The consistency check and safing are not
redundant for the hardware that when fails
causes uncommanded motion• They are also
only designed to stop the RMS in 2 feet,
which may not prevent collision.
• A Criticality 1 failure is considered to be any failure
that causes uncommanded motion, uncommanded release,
uncommanded derigidization, or loss of capability to
move a joint or any number of joints. It also includes
the loss of the ability to release a payload, and the
payload hanging up in the snares•
RATIONALE: Uncommanded motion in its worst case can
cause the loss of vehicle if the arm or
payload struck a window or damaged the
payload bay doors so they could not close.
Uncommanded release could cause the payload
to hit the Orbiter, uncommanded
derigidization or a payload hanging up in
the snares can cause the unrestrained
payload on the end effector to swing into
the Orbiter. The loss of the ability to
move a joint or release a payload would
mean the RMS could not be cradled which


























The loss of primary modes will cause loss of mission
(Criticality 2) but backup is considered redundancy for
release of the payload and cradling the RMS for some
failures. Therefore, loss of primary modes is a
criticality 2 as long as backup is available.
RATIONALE: Without primary modes the RMS mission
cannot be accomplished. Backup mode does
not provide enough redundancy to accomplish
the task mentioned in rule i. Backup does
provide some redundancy for failures that
cause loss of payload release or loss of
joint drive. Therefore, the failures that
backup provides redundancy for will be
classified as loss of mission.
For ascent, entry and aborts, the RMS is assumed to be
cradled, latched, and unpowered. Only failures that
can occur while the RMS is in this mode are considered
for those flight phases•
RATIONALE: The RMS is designed for use while onorbit.
During ascent and entry the RMS is latched
and unpowered. No consideration will be
given to failures unless they have an
effect during ascent and entry.
Failure modes are assumed to occur during two arm
operations• If a failure can effect two arms, then the
worst case result of that effect will determine the
criticality.
RATIONALE: The Orbiter is capable of supporting dual
arm operation• If this configuration
proves to be the worst case for a
particular failure, then that will drive
the criticality.
Failures of wire harnesses and bundles (structural
failures, wire to wire shorts, incorrect attachment)
are not considered. Failures of a single wire are
covered by considering loss of input or output from a
component.
RATIONALE: The failure of wire harnesses and bundles
are not being considered because of the








































This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :








NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2126-2
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2127-2
NASA DATA:













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2129-2
NASA DATA:













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS'
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2130-2
NASA DATA:

















[ 3 /2R ] [ NA]
[ 3 /2R ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [
[ ] [ ] [











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2131-2
NASA DATA:



















[ 3 /2R ] [ NA]
[ 3 /2R ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2076-I
NASA DATA:









HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2076-I
NASA DATA:










NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [




























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RMS
i01




[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ASSESSMENT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL RAMIFICATIONS'






























NASA FMEA #: 60-32(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]




COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER ALL RAMIFICATIONS.
SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION WILL PERMIT IOA TO AGREE WITH THE HIGHER









NASA FMEA #: 1520-67A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





















NASA FMEA #: 1520-67A(c)
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 1520-67A(d)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /i ]
rOA [ 1 /1 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















































NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :




































NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]








[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [






















































NASA [ 1 /i 3
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [















NASA FMEA #: 1580-67(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS USED A DIFFERENT REDUNDANCY DEFINITION. THE
MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION WAS USED BY NASA AND IS ACCEPTABLE




































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE






NASA FMEA #: 690-42A(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































CAUTION AND WARNING TONE





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 750-45(a)
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
E ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ ] [ ]














w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















NASA FMEA #: 880-47 (a)
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
















































NASA FMEA #: 880-47(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA _EA #: 890-47(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 1210
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )














NASA FMEA #: 460-37A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS'





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 870-46(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









ASSESSMENT DATE : 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-121











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
z
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
_ASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 950-51(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















































[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
•BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




































NASA FMEA #: 950-51(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [



























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA FMEA #: 30-31(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITIES DUE TO THE USE OF A MORE CONSERVATIVE
REDUNDANCY DEFINITION USED BY NASA. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE











NASA FMEA #: 10-31(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITIES IS DUE TO THE MORE CONSERVATIVE=
REDUNDANCY DEFINITION USED BY NASA. IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE



























LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS
USED BY NASA. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND





















NASA [ 1 /i ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ X J *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)





































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ F ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC C ........
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ F ]
IN] [N]COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF
REDUNDANCY. IoA AccEPTs THE MORE _0NSERVATIVE DEFINIT!Q_AND THE
HIGHER CRITICALITY. THE DIFFERENCE IN SCREEN ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN































NASA FMEA #: 810-45A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



















NASA FMEA #: 850-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS"
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )









































NASA FMEA #: 780-45A(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.






















NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


































NASA FMEA #: 1250-58C(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
z
B
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






NASA FMEA #: 1260-58C(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ASSESSMENT WAS TOO CONSERVATIVE. ADDITIONAL
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA/SPAR REVEALED ADDED LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY










































NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
[ ]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





[ NA] [ X ]
[N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)


































NASA FMEA #: 180-34A(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND







NASA FMEA #: 220-346
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




[ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE













































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE























NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ "P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A_MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND







































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
W
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND











NASA FMEA #: 240-346
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA FMEA #: 210-34A(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND










NASA FMEA #: 200-346
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND




































NASA FMEA #: 41
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS









NASA FMEA #: 40-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR































CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE













NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:












































NASA FMEA #: 330-36A(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 300-36(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
DISREGARD IOA SCREEN EVALUATION.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 320-36A(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS








NASA FMEA #: 290-36(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH WHICH IOA

























NASA FMEA #: 340-36A(g)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









RMS-162 BASELINE [ ]







CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

































ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-163 _














NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
(If _different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE










NASA FMEA #: 290-36 (b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:








































NASA FMEA #: 380-
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

















NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]




NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different_from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



















































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS WAS INCORRECT. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH

























NASA FMEA #: 150-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL_
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS WAS INCORRECT. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH













NASA FMEA #: 140-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]













(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 270-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT .... ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF
REDUNDANCY AND FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH














































[ ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA]
CN] IN]
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [




NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM






























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS _ CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ............
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ fr6m_N_sA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)


















































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF
FUNCTION FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH













NASA FMEA #: 650-42(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





















[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 660-42(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )


























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS PART OF THE PANEL A8L FMEA PACKAGE AND IS FOR THE















































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS PART OF THE PANEL ASL FMEA PACKAGE AND IS FOR THE






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUND_CY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART OF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE (PANEL A8L) ANALYZED
AND ASSESSED IN A SEPARATE PACKAGE. REFER TO MDAC WORKING PAPER





























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART OF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE (PANEL A8L) ASSESSED























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART OF THE S_ARBOARD ARM EPD&C PACKAGE_ ANALYSIS













































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART OF THE STARBOARD ARM EPD&C PACKAGE. ANALYSIS

















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE IS PART OF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE AND IS COVERED IN
MDAC WORKING PAPER 1.0-WP.VA88003-35. REFER TO THE REFERENCED



































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE IS PART OF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE AND IS COVERED IN
MDAC WORKING PAPER 1.0-WP-VA88003-35. REFER TO THIS WORKING












NASA FMEA #: 1530-67A(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


















































NASA FMEA #: 1570-67(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




_THER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE











NASA FMEA #: 1260-58C(b)
NASA _ATA:
BASEqLINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) An_UATE--_ [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASAANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFIN_TION FOR











































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 1520-67A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
[x]
[ ]


















































[ i /i ] [ ]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)





















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
w
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
SCREEN DISCREPANCY. IOA AGREES WITH NASA.
m

















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS ITEM IS PART OF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE PRESENTED IN MDAC
WORKING PAPER 1.0-WP-VA880003-35. REFER TO THIS WORKING PAPER






































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART IF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE PRESENTED IN MDAC





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART IF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE PRESENTED IN MDAC









































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS ITEM IS P_T IF THE MS EPD&C PAC_GE PRESENTED IN MDAC
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART IF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE PRESENTED IN MDAC






























• BASELINE [ ]




NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURHTER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




[ P ] [ F ]











[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS PART OF THE RMS EPD&C PACKAGE PRESENTED IN MDAC























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS P_T_QF THE RMS EPD&C pACKAGE COVERED IN MDAC
WORKING PAPER 1,0_WP-VA880003-35. REFER TO THAT WORKING PAPER




























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS











NASA FMEA #: 4430-210(a)
NASA DATA:
_ BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /iR ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[ F ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE INITIAL IOA ASSESSMENT DID NOT CONSIDER POSSIBLE REDUNDANT
PATHS. SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION AND DISCUSSION WITH NASA AND SPAR
HAVE LED TO IOA'S AGREEMENT WITH THE LOWER CRITICALITIES





















NASA FMEA #: 4410-209(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE










NASA FMEA #: 4440-210(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]














NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE









NASA FMEA #: 4480-211(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE


























NASA FMEA #: 4460-211(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






[ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ASSESSMENT. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH

































NASA FMEA #: 4470-211(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA FMEA #: 970-52(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA FMEA #: 530-40(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










NASA [ i /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITIO_ OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE



















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTLIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE







NASA FMEA #: 520-40(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE






































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTLIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE









NASA FMEA #: 520-40(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




FURTHER IOA_ALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

























NASA FMEA #: l140-57A(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT i ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA UTLIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE











NASA FMEA #: l130-57A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE i








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)








































NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
L
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 520-40(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)





















C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)


































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]







































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] c ] r i [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




















[ 1/1 ] [ ]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]




[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS" CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



















[ ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN]
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




























NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 430-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [



































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 1050-
NASA DATA:
"BASELINE [ ]






D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 1050-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 1060-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ I /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 1060-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)-
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT EVALUATION AND
APPLICATION OF FUNCTION/REDUNDANCY DEFINITIONS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS






















NASA FMEA #: 1060
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: I070-56(a)
NASA DATA:
B_SELI}_[ ]





ITEM: D & C INVERTOR NETWORK





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND ADDITIONAL EVALUATION REVEALED
REDUNDANCY PATHS FOR THIS FUNCTION. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS







































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ADDED A NEW FMEA. IOA AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES









NASA FMEA #: 1070
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_DEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



























D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE














D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
. CIL RETENTION TIONALE:
REMARKS:
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)





































D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




























COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
C N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE












































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL METHODS FOR
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

































NASA FMEA #: 1050
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 1050
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)




































SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:





















SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]







COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 1071
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[X]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 1070
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)-
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE













NASA FMEA #: 1071
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [































NASA FMEA #: 1070
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE






















INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:






















INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:





































INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 1090
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS





















NASA FMEA #: 1090
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS"
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 1090
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






















NASA FMEA #: 1090-56A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )












NASA FMEA #: 1090-46A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















NASA FMEA #: 1090-56A(a)
NASA DATA:-
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)













NASA FMEA #: 1090-46A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT




.... HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
J
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)



























NASA FMEA #: 1490-66(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE OPERATING
PROCEDURES TO OVERCOME THIS FAILURE. IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA











LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ i /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
IF] IF]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ASSESSMENT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
FAILURE. SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION AND DISCUSSIONS W/NASA SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER REVEALS ADDITIONAL FACTS WHICH ALLOW IOA TO AGREE WITH































NASA FMEA #: 1500-67(a)
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B









[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






































NASA FMEA #: 1590-69(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ASSESSMENT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
FAILURE. SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION AND DISCUSSIONS W/NASA SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER REVEALS ADDITIONAL FACTS WHICH ALLOW IOA TO AGREE WITH











NASA FMEA #: 960-52(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [





(If different from NASA).
] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: iii0-57(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













NASA FMEA #: iii0-57(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA FMEA #: 1020-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
IN] IN] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA/SPAR REVEAL THAT THIS ITEM IS NOT AS



















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





























NASA FMEA #: 1020-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















NASA FMEA #: i000-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA/SPAR INDICATE THAT THIS ITEM IS NOT AS

















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HD_FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ _ ] [ X ]
IN] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NASA FMEA #: 1010-53 (a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ . ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET EFFECT/RATIONALE SHOULD HAVE READ "WILL







NASA FMEA #: 3980-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCU$$1QNS WITH NASA HAVE_ RESOLVED THIS









































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)




















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





[ NA] [ X ]
IN] [ ]-
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ 3 [ ] [ J
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS RELAY IS PART OF THE STARBOARD ARM WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE







































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]











[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS RELAY IS PART OF THE STARBOARD ARM WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE













































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS RELAY IS PART OF THE STARBOARD ARM WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A DIFFERENT DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY.
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR REVEAL SUFFICIENT DATA TO ALLOW








NASA FMEA #: 1220-58B(a)
_ NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION 0FREDUNDANCY.
















































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]

























[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.
AGREES WITH THIS APPROACH AND WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. NO









NASA FMEA #: ii0-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]






RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.
AGREES WITH THIS APPROACH AND WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. NO



































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [F] [F] [X]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.
AGREES WITH THIS APPROACH AND WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. NO










NASA FMEA #: 90-33(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE RAMIFICATIONS




























NASA FMEA #: 1420-64(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [- ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )








































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:



























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:





























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)-
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:















































NASA [ / ]












[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:






















HDW/FUNC A B U
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]




[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]




NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA.



















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









































6 .2V/12 .4V CONTACT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] E ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS" CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
C N ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ _from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:












































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:








































NASA [ / ]












[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
RMS-329










[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) ms
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.


































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ J
IF] IF]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ • ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























• BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.





















NASA FMEA #: 1460-65A(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.











NASA FMEA #: 1460-65(e)
NASA DATA: -
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA),
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.




















NASA FMEA #: 1460-65A(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X J *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
i.
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.









NASA FMEA #: 1460-65(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B U
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.


































NASA FMEA #: 1460-65A(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.









NASA FMEA #: 1340-60(a)
NASA DATA: _
__ _ _BASEL_ [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
i CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_DEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



















NASA FMEA #: 1340-60(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA













































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS" CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE






ASSESS_ _ ID: RMS-352A






NEW [ X ]




HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHERIOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOa [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECO_ENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 581
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







• BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 630-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MDRE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
('ADD/DE[J_TE)













NASA FMEA #: 4320-202(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE


























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 1600
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]







NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALTY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS
























NASA FMEA #: 4020-183(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALTY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS



















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALTY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS




































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)




































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)




















NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DA_A,_" _=_:_ _ _-_
BASELINE [ ] -_,





__:2_ _ _.___ ,
CIL
ITEM





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]















































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











ASSESS_NT ID: _ _S-406A









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )







































NEW [ X ]
RMS
407






NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]




[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 4170-193(d)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)






















NASA FMEA #: 4150-191(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER ELECTRONICSELECT





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 4160
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER ELECTRONICSELECT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 4160-192(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
[X]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























NASA FMEA #: 4160-192(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE_[ ]












NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)










NASA FMEA #: 4160-192(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )








































NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)










NASA FMEA #: 4010-183(c)
NASA DATA:
B_SELrm_ [ ]















[ l /l ] [ ]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
ix]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)

























NASA FMEA #: 3990-182(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ i /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [





































NEW [ X ]









NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ]
[ NA]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASAi
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 4130-189(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALTIY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCO_DED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN











NASA FMEA #: 4130-189(a)
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALTIY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN

































ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-42 IA




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ Z/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






NASA FMEA #: 2760-
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 422
ITEM: COMMUTATOR BITE LOGIC






• BASELINE [ ]




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 2750-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: 2600-116A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]




[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN



































NASA FMEA #: 2610-116A(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE WAS AN ERROR IN THE INITIAL IOA DATA BASE ENTRY. IOA










NASA FMEA #: 3160
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 3190
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS" CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)









NASA FMEA #: 3160-142(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NASA FMEA #: 3160-142(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)







NASA FMEA #: 3160-142(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 2740-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 431
ITEM: 28V BITE LOGIC





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2740-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDACID: 432
ITEM: 28V BITE LOGIC





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA FMEA #: 2720-123B(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ . ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY.







































NASA FMEA #: 3180-143(c)
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]








[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







NASA FMEA #: 3170
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN













































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 3200-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 3200-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C _ i _;_
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN

































NASA FMEA #: 3220-146(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]













(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN










NASA FMEA #: 3220-146(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ p ] [ p ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






























LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT " ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN








NASA FMEA #: 4040-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
IF] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL 10A ANALYSIS AND CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT HAVE BEEN



































NASA FMEA #: 4020-183(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN











NASA FMEA #: 4030-184(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN
































NASA FMEA #: 3180
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ ] IN] [_]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN
















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
NASA
IOA
[1/1 ] [ ]
[ 2/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ] [x]*
[F] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS
















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE


























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
































NASA FMEA #: 2540-I14(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]




[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
: ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN





























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND














































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ . ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 2660-
NASA DATA:
•B_SELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
























NASA FMEA #: 2690/2700
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












































I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P J
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ I ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)









NASA FMEA #: 2690/2700
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN























NASA FMEA #: 2690
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA FMEA #: 2810
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: 3.2 MHZ OSC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST









NASA FMEA #: 2720-123B(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 457
ITEM: 3.2 MHZ OSC







NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST































ASSESSMENT DATE: , 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-457A
NASA FMEA #: 2800-126(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 457
ITEM: 3.2 MHZ OSC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST











NASA FMEA #: 2790
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 457
ITEM: 3.2 MHZ OSC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST












































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 2560-I15(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)


































NASA FMEA #: 2570-
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THISQUALIFIES AS Ai/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN











LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULER UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN





































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH








NASA FMEA #: 2560-I15(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRIGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS







































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES , THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN








NASA FMEA #: 2620-I17(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)










































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]






• BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ l/Z ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN
















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST WITHIN A




















NASA FMEA #: 2620-i17(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P _ [ P _ [ _ _ X _ *




COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 3090
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS








NASA FMEA #: 3160
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS




























NASA FMEA #: 3160
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS





























NASA FMEA #: 2900-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOAACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS






















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]















[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECO_ENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_KS:
INITIAL IOA _ALYSIS FAI_D TO CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE

































NASA FMEA #: 3130-139(c)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 471
ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY











NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS






NASA FMEA #: 3150-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [








































NASA FMEA #: 3110-138(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY











NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE









NASA FMEA #: 3120-139(b)
SUBSYSTE_M: RMS
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS




















NASA FMEA #: 3140-140(d)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY











NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE








NASA FMEA #: 3040-133(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS

































NASA FMEA #: 3060
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS











LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
ix]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS
































NASA FMEA #: 3070
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 474
ITEM: PWM SWITCH DRIVERS
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOAANALYSI$_AND DIS_SSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS












NASA FMEA #: 3050
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /! ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS!
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS








































NASA FMEA #: 2880
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]






DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS
















NEW [ X ]
RMS
477
DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: 3090-137(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH








NASA FMEA #: 3100-137(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH






























NASA FMEA #: 3000-132(d)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 478
ITEM: MDA BITE LOGIC











NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTLIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND










NASA FMEA #: 3020-133A(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 479
ITEM: MDA BITE LOGIC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH









































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RMS
48O




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


















MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR





NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 2600-116A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 482
ITEM: POWER "ON" RESET
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA_GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 2610-116A(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 483
ITEM: POWER "ON" RESET




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH































NASA FMEA #: 2950-130(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS" CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH

































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 1 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH


































NASA FMEA #: 2990-132(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)







NASA FMEA #: 3010-132A(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA
GROUNDRULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH
ALLOWS NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS
STILL IN
















NASA FMEA #: 3120
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 486
ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS













LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH






























NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]









[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 4570-216(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ p ] [ F ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH


































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ i /I ] [ NAI [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





( NA] [ X ]
[ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






NASA FMEA #: 4580
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH










































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS








NASA FMEA #: 4520-214(d)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 493
ITEM: BDA PWR CONDITIONER





NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 4500-212(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 494







NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH









NASA FMEA #: 4530-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 494
ITEM: BDA PWR CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH




























NASA FMEA #: 4510
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH










NASA FMEA #: 4560
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER r
ASSESSMENT".
C ITICALITY RED D CY SC ENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] IX]*
[ NA] [ X ]
IN] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE RESOLVED THIS










NASA FMEA #: 4540-215(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[F] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH






































NASA FMEA #: 4500
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH













ASSESSMENT DAT E : 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-499









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [- ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS

















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
!













































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)



















































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ . ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS












LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
• BASELINE [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF THIS FAILURE. AGREE WITH HIGHER CRITICALITIES AFTER


























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]











[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
: ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF THIS FAILURE. AGREE WITH HIGHER CRITICALITIES AFTER














NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RMS
601
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3 )
B. GRASMEDER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-60 IA
NASA FMEA #: 1970-93(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3 )
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] IN] IN]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTLIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







NASA FMEA #: 2040-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






16 CHANNELANA_G MULTIPLEXOR (3)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTLIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN











































NASA FMEA #: 1970-93(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3 )
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 1980
NASA DATA :
BA-S ELINE [ ]






16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3 )




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MODIFIED FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH







































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]




























(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 1970
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







BINARY COUNTERS (2 )
B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] _ P ] E P ] E X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





















































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RMS
605
SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
B. GRASMEDER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCAMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 2050-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANcY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT i ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE






























NASA FMEA #: 2060
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST WITHIN A
SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A CIRCUIT.








NASA FMEA #: 2010-96(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [x]*
[ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS












































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
1
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRCT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A





























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR REVEALED ADDITIONAL LEVELS OF












NASA FMEA #: 2000-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[P] IF] IF]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALTIY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN































NASA FMEA #: 1990-95(d)
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]





NEW [ X ]
MS -_ _=
611
QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)
B. GRASMEDER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _.....
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [F]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN































NASA FMEA #: 1990/2000
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL [
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 2450-ii0(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
Cp] IF] IF]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i/ CRITICALITY.
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN


































NASA FMEA #: 2460-iii(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE






NASA FMEA #: 2470-Iii(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
...... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





























NASA FMEA # : 2480-111(d)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 2490-i12(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

































NASA FMEA #: 2500-112(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITI CALITY REDUNDANCY _SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A






































NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN








NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




































NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A f/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTLIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



































NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-620 BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
! CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
r FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A




























NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWM ADJUSTER
B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NAS TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




























NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
mmm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_THER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





















NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A 1/1 CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/1R. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 1640
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A


























NASA FMEA #: 1650
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







NASA FMEA #: 1650
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _i_
THE-REFERENCEDMDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT _TCH. _ TH_EY
D0, HOOVER, PROVIDE A sIMILAR-EFFE_ SINCE THEY ExIsT WITHIN A
SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A CIRCUIT.



























NASA FMEA #: 1740/1760/1770/1780
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
IN] IN] IN]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN











NASA FMEA #: 1740-80(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ ] IN] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE













































NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE








































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ ] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE










NASA FMEA #: 1860
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A




























NASA FMEA #: 1850
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] C P ] [ ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A






NASA FMEA #: 1770
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]





(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN


































16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS









NASA FMEA #: 1710-78(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]






[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALTIY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN





























NASA FMEA #: 1730-79(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE


























HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [F]
[ X ] *
IX]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ i/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicabl e) ................
ADEQUATE [ ] _
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN



































NEW [ X ]
RMS
635
I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] [ S ] [ N ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






NASA FMEA #: 1660-76(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




























NASA FMEA #: 1670-76(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 1640
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN
































NASA FMEA #: 1640
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE








NASA FMEA #: 1650
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[N] [S] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN



































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A









NASA FMEA #: 1800
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A








































BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA








NASA FMEA #: 2110-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA












































BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE























BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA


































NASA FMEA #: 2080-98(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 644
ITEM: BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE









NASA FMEA #: 2200-101B(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 645
ITEM: AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT













NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [- ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA








NASA FMEA #: 2250-103A(h)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 647
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC











NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






























NASA FMEA #: 2290-
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 647
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS








NASA FMEA #: 2300-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 647
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 2330-
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 647
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





















[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
































NASA FMEA #: 2280-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_EW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 648
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND








NASA FMEA #: 2310-
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 648
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AN DSPA R HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA
































NASA FMEA #: 2320-
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 648
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA










NASA FMEA #: 2150-i01(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 649
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] C F ] C F ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANLYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS

































NASA FMEA #: 2200-101B(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 649








NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[p] [P] [ ] [X]*
[P] [F] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANLYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS











NASA FMEA #: 2220-I02(e)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 649
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANLYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS












































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ i /I ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANLYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS










NASA FMEA #: 2290-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 649
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT i ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANLYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS






























NASA FMEA #: 2130
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 650
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA
















NASA FMEA #: 2190-101B(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 650
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA





























NASA FMEA #: 2210-I02(d)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 650
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA














NASA FMEA #: 2230-I03(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 650
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCU$S!QNS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE.... MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL_ IOA


























NASA FMEA #: 2280-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 650
ITEM: DUAL 4-BIT LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 2150-i01(b)
NASA DATA: :
BASELINE [ ]






4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[P] IF] IF]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ x ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA
































NASA FMEA #: 2180-101A(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE










NASA FMEA #: 2150-I01(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR TIMING CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





























NASA FMEA #: 2180-101A(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR TIMING CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [ ]
[P] IF] IF]
[N] [ ] [N]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA








NASA FMEA #: 2170-101A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 655
ITEM: 7-BIT BINARY COUNTER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR J
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[PJ [PJ [ ]
[P] [F] IF]
[ X J *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVEMODIFIED THE ORIGINAL IOA
















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 2160
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
IF] [F] [ ]
[P] [F] [F]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ADDED A NEW ITEM TO THIS FMEA. IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA




































NASA FMEA #: 2150
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 1830-83(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]







B C ..... i
[ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[F] IF] IX]
CN] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[l/l ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :




INADEQUATE [ X ]
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GRouND_RULES/_THiS_Q_LIFIES AS A i/--1 CRiTiCALiTY._NASAGROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN











































NASA FMEA #: 1840-83(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 1840-83(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE





































NASA FMEA #: 1830-83(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [F]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 1840-83(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS Ai/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY wHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN



























NASA FMEA #: 1840-83(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CiL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE








NASA FMEA #: 1880-87(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 663
ITEM: ABE OUTPUT DRIVER





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN

























NASA FMEA #: 1880-87(f)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 664
ITEM: ABE OUTPUT DRIVER











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE









NASA FMEA #: 1870-86(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND





























NASA FMEA #: 1870-86(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND


















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RMS
667




[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND

































RMS-668 BASELINE [ ]
1870-86(e) NEW [ X ]
RMS
668
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P
B. GRASMEDER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND













NASA FMEA #: 1910
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 669
ITEM: D & C STROBE
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
IN] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AN_D DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS


































NASA FMEA #: 1910-89(h)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 670
ITEM: D & C STROBE




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE









NASA FMEA #: 1940
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 671
ITEM: D & C CLOCK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS INADVERTENTLY EVALUATED SCREENS.
DISREGARD. THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT
MATCH. THEY DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE
THEY EXIST WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL
































NASA FMEA # : 1910-89 (h)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 672
ITEM: D & C CLOCK




NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







NASA FMEA #: 1890
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES uNC0_DED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN























NASA FMEA #: 1890
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE












NASA FMEA #: 1890
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN

































NASA FMEA #: 1890
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A











NASA FMEA #: 1950
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) D & C I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






























NASA FMEA #: 1950
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) D & C I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:







NASA FMEA #: 1930-90(9)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 679
ITEM: PARITY CHECK LOGIC




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA A/_ALYSIS UTILIZED A MORE EXACTING DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA_A_REES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND


























NASA FMEA #: 1900-88(g)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 680
ITEM: PARITY CHECK LOGIC





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 2340-i04(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..................
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN












































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
B
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE










NASA FMEA #: 2440-109B(k)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /!R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE
































NASA FMEA #: 2340-i04(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 683
ITEM: 200 KHZ CLOCK





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[z/z ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN









NASA FMEA #: 2340-i04(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 684
ITEM: 200 KHZ CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC .....A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































NASA FMEA #: 1700
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 684
ITEM: 200 KHZ CLOCK






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A







NASA FMEA #: 2400-i09(h)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ]
[P] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN



































NASA FMEA #: 2410-109(h)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] [N] [N]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN










NASA FMEA #: 2370-107 (d)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

















































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE












NASA FMEA #: 2360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] [N] CN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/I CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN





























NASA FMEA #: 2360-i06(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:













NASA FMEA #: 1720
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA'S ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMI_ _ FAI-LURE EFFECT SIN_E THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT STRING, OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A































NASA FMEA #: 2440
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOW
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN








NASA FMEA #: 2340-i04(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE








































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [El
[ ] [N] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN










NASA FMEA #: 2350
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE







































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/z ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






NASA FMEA #: 2350
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



























NASA FMEA #: 2360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 695
ITEM: O/P LATCH (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCO_4ANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






NASA FMEA #: 2360-I06(c)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 696
ITEM: O/P LATCH (2)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANLYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




































NASA FMEA #: 1690
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 696
ITEM: O/P LATCH (2)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENET STRING OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A






NASA FMEA #: 2360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 697
ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]




[ p ] [ F ]






[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY OT 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN
































NASA FMEA #: 2360-I06(c)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 698
ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE









NASA FMEA #: 1680
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 698
ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ F ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE




























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
RMS-801






[ ] [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)








































NASA [ 1 /i ]





COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)





















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
IN] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY THE



































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
RMS-803










[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 3800-176(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 3720
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:








NASA FMEA #: 3630
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
RMS-807







NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 3740
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND































NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
b
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND










NASA FMEA #: 3640
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
IOa [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





























NASA FMEA #: 3630
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)








NASA FMEA #: 3730
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER,PROVIDE A SIMILAR FAILURE EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST
WITHIN A SEQUENTIAL COMPONENET STRING OR AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF A



































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND





















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 3790
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........












































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)











NASA FMEA #: 3800
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF










NASA FMEA #: 3850
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)










































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
RMS-820 BASELINE [ ]
3900 NEW [ X ]
82O
CLOSED MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND







NASA FMEA #: 3890
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY ITS












































NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 3920
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
[P] [P] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF


























NASA FMEA #: 3930
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND








NASA FMEA #: 3880
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I " ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
































NASA FMEA #: 3981
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REFERENCED MDAC AND NASA FMEA ARE NOT A DIRECT MATCH. THEY
DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A SIMILAR EFFECT SINCE THEY EXIST WITHIN A













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA-
RMS-825 BASELINE [ ]
3890 NEW [ X ]
825
OPEN MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 3860-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )


































NASA FMEA #: 3470-157(j)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





EXTEND MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF








NASA FMEA #: 3480
NASA DATA: _ ...._
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


















































NASA FMEA #: 3450-156(h)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND








NASA FMEA #: 3460
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C_
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)































NASA FMEA # : 3440-155 (g)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





DERIGIDIZED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND









NASA FMEA #: 3430-155(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF








































NASA FMEA #: 3390
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





CLOSED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF






















NEW [ X ]
835
CLOSED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C :
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND




































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
836
PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDITONER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF








NASA FMEA #: 3500
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]








[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [














































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
RMS-838
3410
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
838
OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 3420
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF



































NASA FMEA #: 3570
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [












ASSESSMEN T DATE: 1516/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-840A






NEW [ X ]
84O









NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)






























NASA FMEA #: 3570
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





RIGID/DERIGID BRAKE/CLUTCH POWER SWITCH DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 3550
NASA DATA:_
BASELINE [ ]





RIGID/DERIGID BRAKE/CLUTCH POWER SWITCH DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
























NASA FMEA #: 3570
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS








NASA FMEA #: 3560
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C








RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS










































HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDUNDANCY. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC B CA
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA EVALUATION INCLUDED A MORE STRINGENT DEFINITION OF FUNCTION
AND REDU_-ANcY. IOACONCU-RS--WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND






























NASA FMEA #: 3570
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS








NASA FMEA #: 3560
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS


















































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 3330
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





MULTIPLE ACTIVATE CMD INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....!_!_ _
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)












































[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[x].
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA_ [ NA] [ J [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS






















NASA FMEA #: 3610
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ _ [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
















NASA [ 1 /i ]


































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]



























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]



























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS





















NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:







NASA FMEA #: 3950-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CRITICALITY RED_DANcY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ ][ NA] [ F ] [ F ]
IN] [ ] IN]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS





































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[X]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS




















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






































RMS-862 BASELINE [ ]
3620 NEW [ X ]
862
STATOR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA DATA: ' _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ......
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ ] [N] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) = _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





































NASA FMEA #: 3670
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 864






NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















NASA [ 1 /i ]





COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)









































NASA [ 1 /I ]





COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 3680
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











H DW/FUN C A B C
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ / ] [ ] [ ] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [













































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / _ E i E I E i [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 3560
NASA DATA:
..... BASELINE [ ]i_ i . ,






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)



























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 3680
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)

































NASA FMEA #: 3260
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 3260
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 3250
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 3520
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 3250
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 3230
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]





CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































NASA FMEA #: 3230
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] IN]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 3240
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









































NASA FMEA #: 3240
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










NASA FMEA #: 3330
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 3330
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)











NASA FMEA #: 3310
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)












































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
RMS-883
3320
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
883
MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)



















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
884
CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 3330
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 3360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)


























NASA FMEA #: 3350
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 3330
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)




































NASA FMEA #: 3280
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ J [ ] [ J
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x J *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 3350
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 3510
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 3340
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL DETECTOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY ITS































NASA FMEA #: 3340
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL DETECTOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY ITS








NASA FMEA #: 3580
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [














































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY ITS







NASA FMEA #: 3600
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
RMS-891
3270
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
891
CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 3530
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C _
[ 1/1 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 3270
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 3540
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY ITS







































RMS-893X BASELINE [ ]






COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ER] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND SPAR HAVE ENABLED IOA TO MODIFY ITS

















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
i FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS WAS CONSIDERED A STRUCTURAL FAILURE WHICH NASA DID NOT











































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT i ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



































COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
[N] IN] [N] [N]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE

















NASA DATA: _ _ _
BASELINE[ ]




NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THE



































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 4400-207(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC _ A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






































NASA [ / ]











COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]









[ ] C ] [
[ ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

















































NEW [ X ]
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
ClL
ITEM






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)


















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]











[ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





















NASA FMEA #: 50-32(d)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RED D CY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 70-32(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicabl e )


















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]











[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [


















NASA FMEA #: 230-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ p ] [ F ]
[ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)












NASA FMEA #: 280-36(a)
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)




































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]








[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 360-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUND_CY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 360-
NASA DATA: _=
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [













































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [























NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)












































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]













[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: 500-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER IOA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA HAVE RESOLVED THIS




























LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)








NASA FMEA #: 540-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [















































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]







COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]





NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: I120-57(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]









[ ] [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)








NASA FMEA #: 1170-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 1270-58C(c)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20029
ITEM: LOWER ZENER DIODE





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )














NASA FMEA #: 1370-59A(c)
NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)



























NASA FMEA #: 1380-61(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 1390-61(a) AND 59(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






+/- 12V DC, +I0V DC







NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]






[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)



































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




[p] [p] E ] IX]*





(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)









NASA FMEA #: 1450-65(d)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :


































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]













[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [






















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] •







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 1600-69 (b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 1610-70(c)
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






































NASA FMEA #: 900-48(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20371
ITEM: IN PROGRESS LIGHT





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )














































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 940-50 (a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: I080-56(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)





































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 1320-59A(d)
NASA DATA:
_ B-ASET,INE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A L B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)





























NASA FMEA #: 1430-64(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 1440-64(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











































[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 620-41A(e)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]













(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





























NASA FMEA #: 4490
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






B/U JOINT SELECT SWITCH





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 2670-122(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 1/1 ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN








































NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [








































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [













NASA FMEA #: 2780
NASA DATA_ ,-
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20510
ITEM: BITE TEST CIRCUIT





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]








[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)








































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] -










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN


















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )















































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA DATA: _ _
_BASELIN_E [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C ....
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A i/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN







































NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 4550-215(b)
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 2920
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TRANSISTOR, DRIVE 1 CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 2940
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TRANSISTOR, DRIVE 2 CIRCUIT









NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]





(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA FMEA #: 3151
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM. UNDER IOA
GROUND RULES, THIS QUALIFIES AS A I/i CRITICALITY. NASA GROUND
RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN




























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITEM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN






NASA FMEA #: 1810
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [











NASA FMEA #: 1950-91(L)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
(If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 2270
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:







































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C ......
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITWM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN













NASA FMEA #: 2020-96(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITWM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 2420-i09A(i)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20710
ITEM: PDC INT-2 OUTPUT





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[z/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES UNCOMMANDED MOTION OF THE ARM.





RULES UTILIZE A SOFTWARE ITWM AS UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WHICH ALLOWS
NASA TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY TO 2/IR. THIS ISSUE IS STILL IN




















NEW [ X ]




NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



















NASA FMEA #: 3770-175(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]







[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable) ......





































NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA _A #: 3290
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20896
ITEM: CCW ENABLE LOGIC





NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)

































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
RMS-20897
3300










[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ 1 /i ]







COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [



















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l
(ADD/DE LETE )







































































































































D & C ADDRESS DECODER INP
D & C ADDRESS DECODER INP
D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUT
D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUT
D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUT


















































LOSS OF WORD 0
OPEN























































































































































































635 I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SH
636 I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SH
635 I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SH






































































































I/P LATCH (2) OPEN
O/P LATCH (2) OPEN
28V CONTACT OPEN
200 KHZ CLOCK OPEN
O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SH SHORTED
DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONT OPEN
O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SH OPEN
SYNL CIRCUIT OPEN
SYNC CIRCUIT SHORTED
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT OPEN
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT OPEN
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT OPEN
16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR OPEN
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT OPEN
RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL OPEN
10V CONTACT SHORTED
RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL OPEN
VALIDITY CHECK SHORTED
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST SHORTED
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST SHORTED
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT RESIST
UPPER SER!AL_HI_T RESIST






D & C STROBE
D & C CLOCK
PARITY CHECK LOGIC
D & C CLOCK ....
D&C RESPONSE CIRCUIT
D&C RESPONSE CIRCUIT
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPL
16 C_NEL _A__LO_ _LTI PL
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPL
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPL
VOLTAGE COMPARATOR







































































































ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERT
VOLTAGE COMPARATOR
REFERENCE VOLTAGE GENERAT
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPL
S AM_PLEAND HOLD GATED OP
SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP
SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP
VOLTAGE COMP_TOR
BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES
BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATO
BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES
SAFING SWITCH
BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATO
BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATO
BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATO
BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATO
NAND GATE
DUAL 4-BIT LATCH
4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMP TO
FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECT
7-BIT BINARY COUNTER
4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATO





































































































































































MULTIWINDING OUTPUT T_S OPEN
MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANS






















O/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL


































































































































TRANSISTOR, DRIVE 1 CIRC
TRANSISTOR
















DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING
10V CONTACT
10V CONTACT























































































































CAP/REL-BRAKE &-C-LU-TCH FA- SHORTED
CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FA OPEN
RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH SHORTED
RIG/DERTG BRAKE & CLUTCH - OPEN
CAP/REL B_ _ & CLUTCH AC
CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH AC
CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVE
CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LO
RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTA
RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTA






























OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITION FAIL ON
DERIG_DIZED MSW SIGNAL CO
RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDI
RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDI
MANUAL CONTACT
AUTO CONTACT
PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CON
RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH



































































































































































































POSITION ENCODER DATA PRO
POSITION ENCODER DATA PRO









































































































































LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
LOSS OF 2
NO OUTPUT




















































































































































































































This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
023, Analysis of the Remote Manipulator System, (12 January
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NST$ 22206. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :









SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:


































A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.ENT.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DiNG/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.BRK. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SF.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















FAILS IN PROCEED OR SLOT MODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :






























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.EEM. 10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:


















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND_CONTROL PANEL




































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :










END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.EEM. 12
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES














B [NA ] C [NA ]
DISPLAY AND CONTROLP_EL
DC.SD.EEM. 13
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: i/i ° AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /









DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.EEM. 14
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM. 15
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
10V POLE
CRITICALITIES















DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.EEM. 16
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






oRBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL P_EL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM. 17
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









































































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.EEM. 18
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL P_EL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20016 ABORT:
ITEM: JOINT SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS STUCK
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC/SD/KS/3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.JS.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2 ) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SD.10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.II
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SD.12
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SD.13
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SD.14
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.MA.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










END EFFECTOR MANUAL COINTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.EMC.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF






























A [NA ] B [NA ]
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL












CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.DB.10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SD.15
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSITIVE COMMANDS WILL BECOME NEGATIVE. NEGATIVE COMMANDS ARE
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20028 ABORT:
ITEM: PARTS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.SD.16
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM. 19









































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :




























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.THC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.PS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20032 ABORT:
ITEM: +/- 12V DC, +IOV DC
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF POWER

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.CP.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: / _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.PS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.RHC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























ROTATIONAL _D CONTROL_R _ _ _........
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: /
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
_CATION: DISP_Y _D CONTROL P_EL
P_T _BER: DC.HC._C.6
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTU_L FAILU_II _
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:






































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.CR.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.CR.9































TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: / _
LANDING/SAFING: / _ _ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.THC.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



































































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.THC.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.AS.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































LEAD ANALYST : B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.AS.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.AS.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]






































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.RM.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















INPUT SHIFT REGIS_E_ ..........
SHORTED _ _ _ _,
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS








SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: / ......
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.DB.11
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.VD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.XX.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.RHC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.RHC.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.HC.THC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :

























DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
DC.SD.LTG.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















B/U JOINT SELECT SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: / _ ....i.... _ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER:
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS








SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LocATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.16
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.



































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.17
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 17
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

























LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :



























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :





























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER : ABE. MDA. 21
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:











































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS :













CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





:_ C [NA ] ....
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20521 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSISTOR, DRIVE 1 CIRCUIT
FAILS LOW
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS
2 ) MDA







SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_UNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














































TRANSISTOR, DRIVE 2 CIRCUIT
FAILS LOW


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























































SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: RMS

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS DATA IS GENERATED. UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MCIU



























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 20704 ABORT: /
ITEM: D&C RESPONSE CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED _ ....






























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCUL.MC.10
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD. II
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: / _ i _:






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20711 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN





























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















































B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /








































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: / _ _




































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.BM.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.BM.A3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





























NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment






Item still under discussion.
time.
No resolution at this
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